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JURISDICTION OVER EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS-
PATHS THROUGH THE GREAT GRIMPEN MIRE
JOSEPH E. FORTENBERRY*
"'That is the Great Grimpen Mire,'
said he .... 'It is an awful place.' ""
I. INTRODUCTION
Judges' and lawyers3 have devoted time to the subject of extraterritor-
ial violations of statutes proscribing private restrictions on freedom of
commerce for more than half a century, but the matter is still very far
from being resolved in a satisfactory manner. While this essay deals pri-
marily with the issue of jurisdiction over actions outside the United States,
the jurisdictional arguments are conditioned by the background of com-
plex legal puzzles and policy conflicts in the general field of antitrust.
Although the case law in the international area does not reflect the
turmoil to the same extent that domestic cases do, there is considerable
upheaval in the field of antitrust, which often makes it difficult to tell ex-
actly (or approximately) what the law is.4 Even in that rare case where
there is no dispute over the facts, a court will often be confronted with a
difficult legal question.
The nature of the transactions attacked in international antitrust suits
further complicates the task of a court. For the most part these transac-
tions will be "multistate" or "transnational" in character,5 so that consid-
erations of comity, international politics, enforceability and international
economics, which seldom, if ever, enter into a purely domestic antitrust
case, become highly significant.
As a result of the multistate nature of the transactions, there is likely to
be a conflict between two or more national policies which cannot easily be
reconciled. While slavery and piracy are universally condemned, cartels
Member of the Alabama Bar.
'The Hound of the Baskervilles in 2 A. DOYLE, THE ANNOTATED SHER.OCK HOLMES 3,
47 (W. Baring-Gould ed. 1967).
2 E.g., American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company, 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (Holmes,
J.).
3 E.g., Hunting, Extra-Territorial Effect of the Sherman Act, 6 ILL. L REV. 34 (1911).
4 See, inter alia, Brown Shoe Co. Inc., v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States
v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270 (1966); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Former Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp. 394
U.S. 495 (1969). "There is little doubt that now the antitrust laws are characterized by ambiguity
as well as flexibility." ANcrusr POLICY-EcoNoMICs AMI LAW ix (S. Berki ed. 1966).
5 An example of an international antitrust case which presents no significant "multistate" or
"transnational" aspects is United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Company, 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D.
Cal. 1966), af)d per curia 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
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are illegal per se in the United States,' illegal if unregistered or if guilty
of misuse of power in France, and often not only legal but able to use
the law to compel competitors of the cartels to join up in Belgium.'
Thus, the field is full of potential pitfalls; and there are no certain
methods, it will be argued, given the present state of knowledge the pres-
ent nationalistic character of the world, and the varying national atti-
tudes toward antitrust, for laying down simple and definite rules regarding
the extent of our antitrust jurisdiction abroad. In other words, the burden
of this article is that one cannot have a highway through the great Grim-
pen Mire of international antitrust jurisdiction. One must be content with
seeking relatively safe paths through it.
The process of claim to apply our antitrust laws to conduct outside
our national boundaries is considered in detail in an Appendix. The text
of the article first considers a list of policy preferences for antitrust juris-
diction abroad. Approaches taken to the subject in the past and a number
of alternative approaches which could be taken in the future are then dis-
cussed. The final section attempts to draw conclusions of a general na-
ture.
II. A POLICY FOR FOREIGN ANTITRUST JURISDICTION
A. No Attempt to Catch All "Violators"
An attempt to condemn every activity in the world which, measured
by American antitrust standards, would violate our law is neither a work-
able goal nor a wise policy. The Antitrust Division of the Justice Depart-
ment has never had sufficient funds to attempt this "dragnet" approach in
domestic antitrust; it seems wholly improbable that it will ever have the
money to pay for a worldwide version of that approach. Furthermore, it
might well be impossible to hire enough qualified personnel, even given
limitless funds, to carry out the investigatory work necessary to bring the
actions. Quite apart from questions of feasibility, the spectacle of the
American Government engaging in a worldwide crusade to free the world
of trade restraints would be likely to have the unfortunate appearance of
an imperialistic scheme to dominate world markets. The basic rules of our
policy must, therefore, include the rule that we shall be selective in the
bringing of actions.
B. Preference for Attacking per se Violations
Those activities which have been condemned by the courts as illegal
per se should be the prime target of foreign antitrust actions. There are
6 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
7 INT'L LAw ASS'N, REPT. OF 51sr CONE. 442 (1965).
8 Id. at 439-41.
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several reasons for this approach. First, extraterritorial application of trade
regulations involves the courts in an aggregation of delicate policy judg-
ments. There is no reason to complicate the judicial task by requiring that
the court make an assessment of the reasonableness of a restraint in the
context of the vast international economic realm, if the alternative of the
simpler per se approach is available. Second, the per se rules are based on
a judgment that the activities they condemn are wholly lacking in redeem-
ing productive importance. They are deemed unlawful per se because
they are unjustifiable. This being the case, condemnation of foreign per
se violations runs very little risk of destroying beneficial effects of the
restraints imposed by the defendants, whereas an attack on violations
which are not unreasonable per se carries with it a danger that the good
consequences will be carried away with the bad. Third, the trend of de-
cided cases in antitrust shows that the Justice Department has attacked
foreign per se violations in large numbers and has not devoted its atten-
tions to foreign "rule of reason" cases.' This long-term trend, this "judg-
ment of quiescent years," is not to be set aside as a policy basis except
for substantial reasons.
C. Probability of Detriment to the American Economy
As shall be argued later, the "effects" test for jurisdiction, while often
a useful touchstone, is not completely satisfactory as a policy instrument
for separating activities which ought to be condemned from those which
should be left alone. In the place of the effects test, the use of a test which
looks to the "probability of detriment to the American economy" is pro-
posed. This test would produce a more reasonable basis for differentiat-
ing the two categories of cases.
1. Scope of the Restraint
The greater the percentage of participants in the market bound by the
restraint, the greater the number of nations covered by the restraint, the
greater the percentage of the commerce in the relevant market covered by
the restraint, the longer the time covered by the restraint, the more likely
it is that the restraint will result in a substantial detriment to American
commerce.
2. Nature of the Commerce Restrained
The greater the importance of the commerce in question to the Ameri-
can economy, in terms of the significance to our domestic economy of for-
9 See United States v. Sisal Sales Corporation, 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (intentionally ac-
quired monopoly); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(cartel); United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (mar-
ket division); United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center Inc., 1963
TRADE CAS, 5 70,600 at 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (price fixing, group boycott).
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eign commerce in the products, the greater the probability of a detriment
to our economy. For example, a restraint on the production of widgets
in the mythical nation of Acrimonia will be of concern to the United States
if the United States imports or exports substantial numbers of widgets
from or to Acrimonia, but will be much less of a problem if corporations
in the United States produce widgets at full capacity and sell all their wid-
gets in the United States, and consumers in the United States buy all of
their widgets from domestic producers. The United States would similarly
be uninterested in the restraint if domestic consumers have no need for
widgets.
D. Least Inteiference with Foreign Interests Compatible with
Safeguarding Our Interests
This is an important policy goal, but one hard to state in exact terms.
"Our interests" broadly defined include exclusive American interests in
forbidding private restrictions on foreign and domestic trade, in increasing
and preserving competition in the American markets both within and with-
out the United States, and in increasing the effectiveness of our wealth
process. Foreign interests include preservation of a certain economic way
of life, promotion of their local wealth processes, and a general interest
in being left alone by other nations in regard to what are believed to be
domestic matters. Wherever we can implement our policy in such a way
as to cause the least possible interference with what foreigners consider to
be "their" problems, we should do so. But this is a counsel of perfec-
tion; ad hoc balancing may have to be resorted to in individual cases where
interests are competing.
E. Furtherance of Inclusive Interests
Any policy should seek to further 5 clusive interests in the United
States, but it should also seek to further inclusive interests of all partici-
pants in the wealth process worldwide. These inclusive interests compre-
hend, inter alia, amicable relationships in matters of trade among the
nation-state participants (international trade will be the loser if nation A
attempts to apply its antitrust laws to nation B's domestic industry in such
a manner as to reconstruct completely the industry of B, and B retaliates by
placing high tariffs on products imported from A), maximum worldwide
production of goods and services (the strongest possible world wealth
process), and the economic development of nations currently unable to
realize their productive potential.
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III. PAST DECISIONS AND PRESENT ALTERNATIVES
A. Past Decisions
1. American Banana
American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company'0 was the first
significant international Sherman Act case. Plaintiff and defendant were
both American corporations. The former alleged that, at the instigation
of the latter, Costa Rican officials had seized plaintiff's Panamanian banana
plantation. After the seizure a Costa Rican court in an ex parte proceed-
ing declared the plantation to be the property of a citizen of Costa Rica.
The latter individual then sold the property in question to defendant's
agents. Both the circuit court and circuit court of appeals held that no
cause of action under the Sherman Act had been stated upon these facts.
The Supreme Court agreed, and, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes, in-
dulged in a bit of judicial overkill. First, the Court said, plaintiff could not
recover because the Sherman Act does not apply to acts done within the
territory of a foreign sovereign." Second, plaintiff could not recover be-
cause a seizure of one's land by a foreign sovereign is an "act of state"
which cannot give rise to a right to recover in tort.'" Finally, plaintiff
could not recover because a plaintiff in tort is vested only with those rights
which the local law of the place of the wrong gives him and does not
possess any rights that he might have had if the tort had occurred in the
forum state.'3
By this decision, the Supreme Court appears to have foreclosed extra-
territorial application of the Sherman Act. In view of American Banands
importance, it is a remarkably insubstantial opinion. Justice Holmes, ap-
parently feeling that the complaint was unworthy of serious considera-
tion,1'4 wrote a beautiful piece of legal mumbo jumbo which hardly deals
with the issue presented by the case.
The opinion begins by discussing the exceptions to the rule that law is
applicable only within the area governed by the lawgiver. Then it states
flatly: "the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an
act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done" and recites the policy basis of the rule:
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor,
to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place
where he did the acts, not only would be unjust but would be an interfer-
10 American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company, 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
"1 Id. at 357.
12Id. at 357-58.
13 Id.
14 "... . plaintiff's case depends on several rather startling propositions." Id. at 355.
"Further reasons might be given why this complaint should not be upheld, but we have said
enough to dispose of it.. . ." Id. at 359.
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ence with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of na-
tions, which the other state concerned might justly resent.15
Justice Holmes then attempted to conjure up a conflict of laws where
none existed. There is no real difficulty in applying American law to the
parties in this situation even though the events took place abroad. No
citizen of Costa Rica would have been cast in judgment or imprisoned if
the Sherman Act complaint had been upheld. The actions of the Costa
Rican government acting through its army and courts would not have been
undone. No adverse effect on Costa Rica's economy was apparent, unless
the judgment against United Fruit had been so enormous that it crippled
the company financially, which seems quite unlikely.
Nor would there have been any hardship on the parties. United Fruit
was and is an American corporation of some prominence; unquestion-
ably, it was aware of the Sherman Act. The complaint alleged knowing
and willful monopolization and predatory practices. To compare United
Fruit to an unlettered foreigner acting abroad, then being sued in tort for
violation of American statutes because he unwittingly entered the United
States is merely ludicrous.
Finally, the United States has a vital interest in the preservation of com-
petition in its domestic trade in bananas; and, where American business
cuts the throat of competing American business, it would seriously under-
mine this interest to grant immunity to the throat-cutter solely because he
did his cutting abroad.
Justice Holmes' view of the "act of state" doctrine appears unneces-
sarily broad. Essentially all that happened in American Banana was the
seizure of the property of a foreigner, the adjudication that the property
belonged to a citizen of the forum state, and the sale of the property to a
second foreigner of the same nationality as the first. There was no ex-
propriation, nationalization or taking by eminent domain. No apparent
benefit to the government seizing the property resulted, because the cost
of the seizure and the court proceedings must have been borne, at least in
part, by Costa Rica. As the citizen who recovered the property was al-
lowed to sell it to a foreigner, no governmental policy to promote local
ownership of realty was served. The action differs little from an ordinary
land dispute in which the disputed land is seized by the public authority
and awarded to one of the disputants. According to the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law:
An "act of state" . .. involves the public interests of a state as a state, as
distinct from its interest in providing the means of adjudicating disputes or
claims that arise within its territory.... A judgment of a court may be an
act of state. Usually it is not, because it involves the interests of private
151d. at 356.
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litigants or because court adjudication is not the usual way in which the
state exercises its jurisdiction to give effect to its public interests. 16
American Banana looks much more like a private dispute than a matter of
the state's public interests.
Justice Holmes' third line of defense--the "'vested rights" doctrine--
is a legal dogma which was never universally accepted and a dogma which
history has demonstrated to be utterly inadequate.17
2. The Retreat from American Banana
The first signs of a retreat from the threefold prohibition against for-
eign application of the antitrust statute came in 1911. The landmark
American Tobacco case 18 applied the Sherman Act to a market division
contract which restrained American exports and imports, even though the
agreement was executed in the United Kingdom 9 and may well have been
valid and enforceable there. A strict territorial principle' would have
required the court to determine that the agreement was in violation of
British as well as American law in order to hold it invalid, but nowhere
in the opinion does the Supreme Court make such a determination. In a
criminal case decided at the same term of court, one Daily had allegedly
obtained money under false pretenses from the State of Michigan, but per-
formed the acts constituting the false pretenses in the State of Illinois.
He was ordered released from custody on habeas corpus by the federal
District Court on the ground that he had not committed a crime under
Michigan law. The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Holmes,
held that Michigan could apply its criminal law extraterritorially:
... the usage of the civilized world would warrant Michigan in punishing
him (Dailyl, although he had never set foot in Michigan until after the
fraud was complete. Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to pro-
duce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing
the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State
should succeed in getting him within its power.21
Unlike the acts in American Banana, the acts of defendant in Daily
were illegal under the law of the place where they were committed as well
as under the law of the forum. In spite of this distinction, however, the
1 6 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 41, Comment d (1965).
17 A EHRENZWEiG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTsHELL § 6-3 (2d ed. 1970); Babcock v. Jackson,
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 145 (1971); A. EHRENZWIEG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 24 (1967); D. CAvERs,
THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 30-32 (1965); Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus,
- R. I. -, 252 A.2d 176 (1969).
18 United States v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
'OId. at 172.
20 RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws, §§ 311 If. (1934); 2 J. BEALE, CONFLICT
or LAws §§ 311.1 ff. (1935).
21 Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1911).
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case squarely endorses the principle that acts in a foreign jurisdiction, done
with the intent to produce harmful conseqences and actually producing
such consequences within the jurisdiction seeking to apply its law, form a
basis for the application of that law to the actor. Justice Holmes is thus
an architect of the very siege engines used to bring down the fortress he
erected in American Banana.
Two years after these cases the Supreme Court decided the case of
United States v. Pacific & Arctic Co.22  The government claimed that a
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman and Interstate Commerce Acts had
been entered into in regard to the shipping of freight from the continental
United States to the territory of Alaska. In reversing judgment on de-
murrer for the defendants, Justice McKenna endorsed the principle that
the antitrust laws did not apply extraterritorially, at least to the conduct of
foreigners, but relied on actions taken by the defendants within the United
States to hold that the demurrer should not have been sustained. While
the holding of Pacific & Arctic, that the fact that part of the activities in
violation of the Sherman Act take place outside the United States does not
prevent application of the Act to the activities as a whole, is dear enough,
it is much less dear exactly why the court thought it had jurisdiction. The
opinion makes reference to the conspiracy's control over transportation in
the United States, apparently an allusion to the fact that the conspiracy
had effects within the United States. But it also refers to activities within
the United States and apparently renounces any notion that foreign citi-
zens or corporations operating abroad could be prosecuted or sued under
the Sherman Act. Perhaps the case means that there are two conditions
precedent to the application of the antitrust laws to conspiracies or contracts
outside our borders: (1) there must be effects on American commerce,
(2) part of the proscribed activity must take place within the United States.
Consistent with this interpretation of Pacific & Arctic is a 1917 case
involving similar facts. In a private action under the Sherman Act plain-
tiff alleged that defendants combined in restraint of trade by offering, in
effect, lower prices to American companies which shipped goods to South
Africa exclusively on their shiplines than were offered to companies which
did not patronize their shiplines exclusively. Although the plaintiff pre-
vailed in the trial court, the circuit court of appeals reversed. In reversing
the judgment of the circuit court of appeals, the Supreme Court, again
speaking through Justice McKenna, noted that, although the combination
was formed abroad, it was put into operation in the United States and it
affected the foreign commerce of the United States.23 Thus it appeared that
where an effect on American commerce could be shown and where overt
22228 U.S. 87 (1913).
23 Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917).
[Vol. 32
1971] EXTRATERRITORIAL ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS 527
acts in furtherance of the conspiracy took place in the United States, the
Sherman Act could be applied a
The Sisal Sales case,2" decided ten years after the preceding case, relied
on the domestic nature of the conspiracy, on overt acts committed within
the United States, and on intent to affect American commerce. The court
also rejected the "act of state" defense raised by defendants on the basis of
discriminatory foreign legislation apparently passed for their benefit, thus
pointing the way to the current narrow exception for acts of state and in-
consistent foreign law in the antitrust field.2"
A somewhat later case suggested another basis for jurisdiction in the
antitrust field. In the well-known Branch27 case, petitioner was the pro-
prietor of a correspondence school of the fly-by-night variety. The Fed-
eral Trade Commission issued a cease and desist order forbidding petitioner
from continuing to represent directly or indirectly that his school was an
accredited institution and that the so-called diplomas and degrees he
awarded were recognized by any governmental agency or any reputable
college or university. Petitioner sought to have the order set aside on the
ground that the FTC lacked jurisdiction, contending that the only persons
likely to be deceived were residents of Latin America. The Seventh Cir-
cuit, speaking through Judge (later Justice) Minton rejected petitioner's
argument on the familiar grounds that: 1) there were substantial activities
connected with the practice within the United States (it was conceived,
initiated, concocted and launched on its way in the United States), 2)
the effects of the practice were within the United States and the FTC had
jurisdiction to protect commerce within the United States, and 3) foreign
activity of an American citizen could be controlled by the United States.
But the Court also said:
The United States may protect its commerce from the wrongful acts
of its own citizens who remain, as petitioner did, within the United States
and whose wrongful acts are prejudicial to other citizens of the United
States who are in competition for that commerce.28
Here the court seems to be employing the "passive personality" principle,
basing its jurisdiction in part at least on harm caused from (or in) for-
eign countries to American citizens. Although the passive personality
principle has not played a significant role in jurisdiction in this field, its
use in the past makes it an obvious candidate as an alternative to more
commonly used bases. 9
2 See also Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
2
rUnited States v. Sisal Sales Corporation, 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
20 Id. at 274-76.
2 7 Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944).
28 Id. at 35 (emphasis supplied).
9 See discussion Section III, C, 1, supra.
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3. Alcoa and the Modern Era
It is not surprising that the decision which is perhaps the most signif-
icant single Sherman Act decision of the last fifty years is also the leading
case on the extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws. In the Alcoa0
case the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (acting in place of the
Supreme Court, which was unable to decide the case for lack of a quorum)
first determined that the American defendant, Alcoa, was not a party to a
Swiss cartel of aluminum producers, known as the Alliance, which com-
prised aluminum producers from Canada, Germany, France, Britain, and
Switzerland."' After reaching this conclusion, the court considered the
Alliance and the two agreements implementing its purposes. In the course
of this portion of the opinion the court discussed the rationale of the anti-
trust laws in great detail, and the discussion deserves extended quotation.
The court first stated that, although the question was one of American
statutory and constitutional law, a construction of the law could not be
carried out without regard to the conflict of laws.
We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its
courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United
States.... On the other hand, it is settled law... that any state may im-
pose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct
outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state
reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.
There may be agreements made beyond our borders not intended to af-
fect imports, which do affect them, or which affect exports. Almost any
limitation of the supply of goods in Europe . . . may have repercussions
in the United States if there is trade between the two. Yet when one con-
siders the international complications likely to arise from an effort in this
country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to assume that Con-
gress certainly did not intend the Act to cover them .... for argument we
shall assume that the Act does not cover agreements, even though intended
to affect imports or exports, unless its performance is shown actually to have
had some effect upon them. Where both conditions are satisfied the situa-
tion certainly falls within such decisions as ... Pacific & Arctic... Thom-
sen v. Cayser . . . and Sisal Sales.... It is true that in those cases the per-
son held liable had sent agents into the United States to perform part of the
agreements; but an agent is merely an animate means of executing his prin-
cipal's purposes, and for the purposes of this case, he does not differ from
an inanimate means....
Both agreements [implementing the purposes of the Alliance] would
dearly have been unlawful had they been made within the United States,
and it follows from what we have just said that both were unlawful,
though made abroad, if they were intended to affect imports and did af-
fect them.32
80 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
31 Id. at 439-43.
32 Id. at 443-44 (emphasis supplied).
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The court then reviewed the figures relating to the subject of imports,
and, rather than reaching a conclusion as to whether the agreements af-
fected imports, decided to
*. . dispose of the matter ... upon the assumption that, although the
shareholders intended to restrict imports, it does not appear whether in
fact they did so. Upon our hypothesis the plaintiff would therefore fail,
if it carried the burden of proof upon this issue as upon others. We
think, however, that after the intent to affect imports was proved, the bur-
den of proof shifted to 'Limited' [Aluminium Limited, Alcoa's former
sister corporation 33 in Canadal. In the first place a depressant upon produc-
tion which applies generally may be assumed, ceteris paribus, to distribute
its effect evenly upon all markets. Again, when the parties took the trouble
specifically to make the depressant apply to a given market, there is reason
to suppose that they expected that it would have some effect, which it
could have only by lessening what would otherwise have been imported.
If the motive they introduced was over-balanced in all instances by motives
which induced the shareholders to import if the United States market be-
came so attractive that the royalties did not count at all and their expecta-
tions were in fact defeated, they to whom the facts were more accessible
than to the plaintiff ought to prove it, for a prima fade case had been
made.3 4
Without saying so, Judge Hand thus effected a major overhaul of the
law of antitrust jurisdiction. Previous cases had relied on the fact that
actions took place within the United States rather than on the less concrete
effects test alone. Furthermore, the existence abroad of a conspiracy
which was intended to affect American commerce was all the plaintiff
need prove to win, unless the defendant could perform the very difficult
task of proving a negative, in a field where disproving effects is a complex
task because of the myriad viariables of the international economy.
Subsequent decisions have followed Judge Hand's lead in applying the
Alcoa rationale to other situations. Philips, a Dutch corporation, was
held to have violated the Sherman Act in the Gener'al Electric case 5 be-
cause of the intended effects its activities had on American commerce in
lamps. Imperial Chemical Industries, a British firm, was held to have
violated the law because of effects on American commerce in man-made
fabrics and other products.36  A number of Swiss firms were held to have
affected the American watchmaking industry. 7
The most significant recent development in the area, after the Alcoa
revolution, has been the narrowing of the act of state defense in antitrust
88 For a definition of "brother-sister corporation," see 26 U.S.C. § 1563 (a) (2) (1944).
24 United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1945).
36United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D. N.J. 1949).
36United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
37 United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 TRADE
CAs. 5 70,600, at 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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cases involving foreign conduct. In the Continental Ore case3 8 a private
plaintiff alleged that its Canadian business had been destroyed by the ac-
tivity of the defendants' wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary. The district
court rejected plaintiff's offer to prove this allegation on the ground that,
since the subsidiary acted as exclusive purchasing agent of the Canadian
government's Metals Controller, the matter was a transaction wholly in
the hands of the Canadian government and whether or not plaintiff was
permitted to sell his material to a customer in Canada was a matter wholly
within the control of the Canadian Government. 9 The Court of Appeals
affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed, distinguishing the American
Banana case:
[Plaintiff does] not question the validity of any action taken by the Ca-
nadian Government or by its Metals Controller. Nor is there... any ques-
tion of the liability of the Canadian government's agent .... What ...
[plaintiff does] contend is that [defendants] are liable for actions which
they themselves jointly took, as part of their unlawful conspiracy, to in-
fluence or to direct the elimination of Continental [plaintiff] from the Ca-
nadian market. As in Sisal, the conspiracy was laid in the United States,
was effectuated both here and abroad, and [defendants] are not insulated
by the fact that their conspiracy involved some acts by the agent of a for-
eign government.
[Defendants] are afforded no defense from the fact that Electro Met of
Canada [defendants' wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary] in carrying out
the bare act of purchasing vanadium from [defendants] rather than Con-
tinental, was acting in a manner permitted by Canadian law. There is
nothing to indicate that such law in any way compelled discriminatory pur-
chasing, and it is well settled that acts which are in themselves legal lose
that character when they become constituent elements in an unlawful
scheme.40
One commentator observed that the Continental Ore case indicates that
parties are ill-advised to rely upon permissive foreign law to justify re-
straints on United States commerce.41
Similarly, in the protracted and celebrated Swiss Watchmakers litiga-
tion, many of the restraints complained of by the United States were en-
couraged by Swiss statutes, devised by Swiss trade associations in which
the government of Switzerland participated, and actively supported and
heartily approved by the Swiss Government.42 In a brief submitted by the
Swiss Confederation as amicus curiae, the following argument was made:
38 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
3) Id. at 703.
40 Id. at 706-07.
41 Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and Foreign Sovereignty, 49 VA. L. REV. 295 (1963).
But see Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas and Oil Co., - F. Supp. - (C.D. Cal.
1971).
42 United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 TRADE CAS.
5 70,600, at 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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This case is of utmost importance to the Swiss Confederation. The
attempt is here being made to apply the antitrust laws of the United
States to hold illegal action taken (a) in Switzerland, (b) at the behest
and with the encouragement of the Swiss Confederation and in conformity
with Swiss law, (c) by the Swiss watch industry, (d) which is both gov-
ernment regulated and affected with a public interest.... Not only does
the present action constitute a direct attack upon the legislation and policy
of the Swiss Confederation; it further seeks to regulate conditions in
Switzerland and to limit the control which the Swiss Confederation may
exercise over its own watch industry.... It has always been held that the
antitrust laws do not apply to acts done in the territory of a foreign sover-
eign in furtherance of that sovereign's law and policy....43
When at length a decision was reached in the Watchmakers case, Judge
Cashin answered the arguments as follows:
The defendants claim that the court should not assume jurisdiction
over activities because American antitrust laws cannot be applied to acts
of sovereign governments.
If, of course, the defendants' activities had been required by Swiss law,
this court could do nothing. An American court would have under such
circumstances no right to condemn the governmental activity of another
sovereign nation. In the present case, however, the defendants' activities
were not required by the law of Switzerland. They were agreements
formulated privately without compulsion on the part of the Swiss Govern-
ment. It is dear that these private agreements were recognized as facts of
economic and industrial life by that nation's government. Nonetheless,
the fact that the Swiss Government may as a practical matter approve of
the effects of this private activity cannot convert what is essentially a
vulnerable private conspiracy into an unassailable system resulting from
foreign governmental mandate. In the absence of direct foreign govern-
mental action compelling the defendants' activities, a United States court
may exercise its jurisdiction as to acts and contracts abroad, if, as in the
case at bar, such acts and contracts have a substantial and material effect
upon our foreign and domestic commerce. .... 44
B. Critique of Past Theories of Jurisdiction
1. Territoriality (Strict)
American Banana and its progeny all rely on some variety of the strict
territoriality principle for jurisdiction in antitrust cases. While the Amer-
ican Banana principle that the Sherman Act stopped at the water's edge
was quicidy abandoned, subsequent decisions have generally relied on the
fact that "constituent elements of the offense" or "overt acts in furtherance
of the conspiracy" had been committed in the United States, as the basis
for applying the law.
4 3 Reprinted in part in INT'L LAW ASS'N, supra note 7, at 575. The author of the brief is
apparently Professor Willis Reese.
44 United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 TRADE
CAS. 9 70,600, at 77,414, 77,456-57.
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Under this theory antitrust violations for which an American court will
give relief must occur wholly or in part within United States territory.
Though this theory is, of course, not the only currently acceptable theory
in the courts, a number of justifications in policy and in law can be ad-
vanced in its favor. The territoriality principle has long been thought to
promote certainty.45  It facilitates proof of violations, because documents
and witnesses relating to the overt acts within the United States will gen-
erally be available to the court, while it might be difficult or impossible for
the court to compel attendance of witnesses or production of documents
in foreign countries. 48  The danger of affronting foreign sovereigns is
greatly reduced, because activities wholly within foreign countries will
not be the subject of actions in America. Further, it may be asserted that
since it is difficult to carry out a conspiracy to restrain American trade
without committing some acts within the United States, extraterritorial ap-
plication of the law is not really necessary to the protection of American
commerce. Finally, it has been argued that American courts cannot apply
the antitrust laws except in a strictly territorial manner without violating
international law.47
Assuming that the territoriality principle does promote certainty, it
may be asked whether this is a situation in which we wish to increase pre-
dictability. Ordinarily, certainty in antitrust statutes is desirable because
businessmen are thereby enabled to know which activities are allowed and
which are proscribed. But the certainty promoted by the strict territorial
principle is a spatial or geographic certainty. A businessman is put on
notice that he can engage in proscribed activities so long as he and his
fellow actors do no acts within the United States. The activity promoted
by this variety of certainty is not condemned by the law because it is
deemed to be consistent with public policy. Since it is not anticompeti-
tive it may be presumed useful, i.e., leading toward the production of more
goods and services. The activity promoted by the latter variety of cer-
tainty is likely to be quite anticompetitive and to lead to detrimental eco-
nomic effects by discouraging American exports or increasing the price of
imports. It carries no presumption of utility.
Although administration of the law would be simplified if proof of
violations were made easier (since a court would not have to enter into the
sticky problems of obtaining information abroad and of establishing the
existence of wholly foreign conspiracies), the ease of administration ought
to be weighed against the danger that activities abroad will result in dam-
45 See, e.g., Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts, 36 W. VA. L. Q. 156, 165, 167
(1930).
46 See the protests made by foreign sovereigns against attempts to compel production of
documents collected in INT'L LAW ASS'N, supra n. 7 at 565 ff.
47 Haight, Internatonal Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE
LJ. 639, 642-43 (1954).
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age to the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States. The
former would certainly appear to carry less weight.
Similarly, while we must be ever mindful of the legitimate interests
of foreigners, it is highly unrealistic to regard all attempts to apply our
law to foreign conduct as a one-way street. We are not meddling in their
affairs while they are leaving us strictly alone. As one authority has stated:
When Switzerland or Canada or any other country employs its govern-
mental processes to protect business entrepreneurs in activities which im-
pair the healthy functioning of community process within the United
States, it is interfering with the internal domestic affairs of the United
States fully as much as the United States may be interfering with the in-
temal affairs of such other country in applying its Anti-trust laws to the
injury-causing activities. . . . In an interdependent world interference by
States in each other's community processes, including economic affairs, is
inescapable. The question is by what principles and procedures such inter-
ference can be moderated and made reciprocally tolerable in the mainten-
ance and expansion of an international economy. 48
The Alcoa case by itself should be sufficient refutation of the argument
that acts within the United States will be a necessary concomitant of any
serious violations of the antitrust laws affecting the United States. If the
aluminum industry can be cartelized in such a fashion, then others can
be similarly organized. And it seems reasonable to expect that the largest
(and thus potentially the most dangerous) anticompetitive organizations
will be the most careful to avoid any activity here.
The charge that an application of the antitrust laws to violations oc-
curring in their entirety outside the United States violates international
law is indeed a serious one and, if correct, would be by itself a sufficient
reason for not applying the law. But it appears that the vast weight of
authority and, more importantly, the practice of states, indicate that such
an application of the antitrust law is perfectly legal under the law of
nations.49
Territoriality, then, appears to be too narrow a basis for jurisdiction,
because it allows violations seriously affecting our commerce to escape sanc-
tions. The courts ought to seek a more comprehensive basis.
48 INT'L LAW Ass'N, supra note 7, at 331 (remarks of Professor M. S. McDougal).
4 9 R STATEME NT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 18; P. JESsUP, TRANsNA-
TIONAL LAw 64 (1956); Falk, International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions
of Legar Order, 32 TEmp. L.Q. 295, 300-02 (1959); Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse:
Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1150-
52 (1956); Note, Limitations on the Federal Judicial Power to Compel Acts Violating Foreign
Law, 63 COLum L. REv. 1441, 1478-79; W. CooK THE LOGicAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAws 10, 14-15, 72, 77; INT'L LAW ASS'N, supra note 7, at 325-26 (remarks of
Professor C. J. Olmstead). See the French cases applying trademark laws extraterritorially: Syn-
dicat du Commerce des vins de Champagne c. Ackerman Laurance (Cour d'Appel d'Angers,
1891) 19 Clunet 1144; Brown v. Wagner (Cour d'Appel de Paris, 1911) 38 Clunet 1192
(semble).
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2. Effects
The test of Alcoa and subsequent cases for applying the laws of the
United States has been stated as follows: "Do these acts or contracts have
a substantial effect upon our foreign commerce. .. ?"0 The effects princi-
ple thus enables American courts which can obtain personal jurisdiction
over the relevant persons and corporations to apply our antitrust statutes to
anticompetive conduct wherever committed, if that conduct produces sig-
nificant detrimental consequences within the United States and was in-
tended to produce such consequences. The danger of unnecessary inter-
ference with the activities of foreign persons and foreign sovereigns is
reduced by the requirements that the detriment be a substantial one" and
that it be intentional. 2
It may be thought, therefore, that the effects principle provides a
method whereby the United States can reach all important violations of
the law, without offending foreigners by attempting to apply its law to
those situations entirely or chiefly concerned with commerce having at
most an incidental effect on American commerce. But it is doubtful that
such a principle in fact represents the sought-for golden mean.
First, as Professor Katzenbach has observed, intended and substantial
effect on American commerce is not, without more, sufficient information
on which to base a judgment that the United States is the nation primarily
interested in the activity causing the effect. ". . . [A]nything that affects
the external trade and commerce of the United States also affects the trade
and commerce of other nations, and may have far greater consequences
for others than for the United States." 3 The Swiss Watchmakers case pro-
vides a simple example. The effects on American watchmaking are patent,
but the need of the Swiss Confederation to regulate a major source of na-
tional income may be of greater relative interest to Switzerland than is the
need to have one minor industry in the United States remain competitive. 4
Professor Falk has expressed dissatisfaction with the effects test as be-
ing unpersuasive and conceptualistic:
It is important that the state asserting jurisdiction involve the most per-
suasive available rationale so that its assertion is made to appear as reason-
able and hence as acceptable as possible . . . horizontal order, with its
emphasis upon reciprocity, depends heavily upon States convincing each
other that they are acting reasonably in regard to the delimitation of
legal competence.
a oW. FuGATE, FoREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUT LAwS 31 (1958).
51 United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center Inc., 1963 TRADE CAS.
5 70,600, at 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Hale and Hale, Monopoly Abroad: The Antitrust Laws
and Commerce in Foreign Areas, 31 TEx. L REv. 493, 532 (1952).
52 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945).
53 Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse, supra note 49, at 1150.
.54 See text accompanying note 41-43, supra.
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The United States has not always offered the most persuasive available
justification for its recent controversial assertions of legal competence.
This has been a consequence of seeking to explain the modern scope of
competence by exclusive resort to an extended conception of the Territorial
Principle. For example, the efforts to vindicate the extension of antitrust
regulation have concentrated upon locating a predominantly foreign event
within the United States by indicating its effect upon the domestic economy;
there is an effort to treat complex cartel arrangements as an analogy to the
man standing in A and shooting into B. 5
The effects test, as its other name--"objective territoriality"-indicates, is
merely an attempt to dress up the old territoriality principle in modern
garb, and, like the strict territoriality principle, does not recognize the inter-
national or transnational nature of the events in question.
Professor Jaeniche of Germany has denounced the effects principle as
"wholly unsuitable" and argued that if it were to become universally ac-
cepted it could form the basis of an unlimited extraterritorial jurisdiction
since "by skillful drafting of a penal statute" a nation "can make any ef-
fect of conduct abroad a constituent element of the crime." 56
Mr. Haight emphasizes the uncertainty which the effects principle pro-
duces:
"[Basing] jurisdiction on effects is to open floodgates and multiply con-
flicts. No lawyer can advise his client in one country regarding the ef-
fects business transactions may have in other countries that may invoke
the laws of other countries. Where a transaction is to operate in another
country then, of course, the laws of that country are examined and com-
plied with. But to try to appraise effects all over the world is just im-
possible."57
The "substantial economic effect" requirement may turn out to be an
insubstantial safeguard against sliding down the slippery slope described
above. The Supreme Court, in a domestic Commerce Clause case, has
stated that a substantial effect can be implied, not from one actor's behavior,
but from a consideration of that intriguing question "What if everybody
did that?":
That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be
trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal
regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of
many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.S8
If courts are willing to uphold domestic regulation by multiplication of
effects, it is not unreasonable to expect them to uphold application of trade
regulation to commerce abroad by the same means.
55 Falk-, International Jurisdiction, supra note 49 at 304-06.
" INT'L LAw ASS'N, supra note 7, at 319.
57 Id. at 342.
58 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942). See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.s. 294 (1964).
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The "intent test" is likewise a weak reed. The Second Circuit was
willing to presume effects from intent, providing the defendant did not
prove himself an economic magician by demonstrating lack of effects."0
Courts have been willing to reverse the process by implying an intent to
violate the law from effects. It is settled that a specific intent to restrain
trade or to build a monopoly is not a necessary part of the proof in an
antitrust case. "It is sufficient that a restraint of trade or monopoly re-
suits as the consequence of a defendant's conduct or business arrange-
ments.... To require a greater showing would cripple the Act."'
The effects test, then, seems unsatisfactory as a means of resolving the
problem of when to apply the American antitrust laws to foreign activity.
3. Abnegation of Jurisdiction Based on Foreign Law
A long-standing rule of American antitrust law, a rule which has its
roots in the American Banana decision, is that acts compelled by foreign
sovereigns cannot form the basis for jurisdiction under the antitrust laws.
The "foreign sovereign activity" exception to jurisdiction could be applied,
as one commentator has pointed out, in three possible situations: "(1)
foreign law or executive authority requires or directs the acts or contracts
in question; (2) foreign law or executive authority acquiesces in such acts
or contracts; or (3) foreign law does not prohibit such acts or contracts."'
However, the current practice of courts, as the commentator notes, is to
deny jurisdiction only in the case of acts falling within the first category.
From Sisal States"2 to the Swiss Watchmakers0 3 the cases repeat the form-
ula that, unless the conduct is compelled by foreign law, it cannot escape
the antitrust laws, if it would otherwise be violative of them.'
This exception to the general rule is certainly justified by common
sense, as far as it goes. There is manifestly an element of unfairness in
forcing a businessman to make the choice between Scylla and Charybdis,
with one state declaring mandatory that which another state forbids. Fur-
thermore, since we allow our antitrust laws to yield state policies in the
form of fair trade legislation, it seems self-righteous and overreaching for
us to apply the law despite specific statutes in foreign countries compelling
the behavior we condemn. The act of state doctrine would appear to cover
this situation since an act by which the state compels behavior of a certain
kind would appear to be one "by which that state has exercised its jurisdic-
5 9 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1965).60 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948). See also United States v. Masonite
Corporation, 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942).
61 FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERcE, supra n. 50, at 50.
62 United States v. Sisal Sales Corporation, 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
63 United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center Inc., 1963 TRADE CAS.
5 70,600, at 77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
64 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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tion to give effect to its public interests." 6  The problem appears, then, to
be that this exception to jurisdiction is acceptable so far as it goes; but it
seems doubtful whether it goes far enough.
As stated above, the policy bases for the exception appear to be two in
number: (1) avoidance of unfairness to defendants by forcing them to
choose between two illegal courses of conduct and (2) respect for the
policy of foreign sovereigns by not questioning the propriety of their com-
pelling a particular course of conduct. In many cases, the present doctrine
provides less than satisfactory results in terms of both policy bases.
As to the protection of defendants from inconsistent laws, there is a
twofold problem. First, the foreign statute or administrative regulation
may be one that is seldom enforced (like Mississippi's late prohibition stat-
ute) or one whose violation would entail a slight penalty, for example,
a fine which had been sizeable at the time the statute was enacted, but
which, through time and inflation, had become nominal.6 In other words,
the present doctrine does not distinguish between compelling foreign viola-
tions which would subject the defendant to serious criminal penalties and
those which might be subsumed under the category of costs of doing busi-
ness. Second, the "legality" of a course of action prescribed by American
law may be of slight comfort to defendant if compelling that course of
action results in the defendant's ruin. This latter point may be illustrated
by a hypothetical case suggested by the famous Imperial Chemical Indus-
tries litigation.67
The Acme Corporation is organized under the laws of Acrimonia and
has its principal place of business there. Acme has entered into a number
of contracts in Acrimonia which have the effect of restraining the export
of beer into America. The contracts are perfectly legal under Acrimonian
law, and effects intentionally inflicted on American commerce are the only
basis of jurisdiction. If Acme is ordered to break all these contracts by an
American court, it will be liable in damages, under Acrimonian law, to all
the Acrimonian corporations, although it almost surely has a perfect legal
right to refuse to perform the contracts, for any reason, if it is willing to
pay damages.
As concerns the need for respecting the foreign sovereign's declared
policy as expressed in laws compelling a certain type of conduct, the Re-
statement of Foreign Relations Law's comments on the act of state doc-
trine are noteworthy:
An "act of state" . . involves the public interests of a state as a
6 RsrATMmr (SEcoND) OF FoREIGN RELATONS LAw, § 41. See Comments c and d
to § 41.
66 Cf. the wrongful death damage "ceiling" involved in Tramontana v. S. A. Empresa de
Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943
(1966).
07 Supra note 9. See 0. HOLiEs, THE COMMON LAW 289 ft. (1881).
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state as distinguished from its interest in providing the means of adjudi-
cating claims that arise within its territory. In determining whether an
act is an act of state, the branch or agency of the government-executive,
judicial, or legislative-that performed the act is not as important as the
nature of the action taken.68
Thus, while it may be said that a legislative or executive statement of prin-
ciple in the form of requirement regarding conduct is likely to be an act
of state,"9 an act of state is not necessarily limited to such a statement.
The determination of what constitutes a fundamental policy interest of a
state, like the determination of what constitutes an act of state, involves
more than a mere determination whether certain conduct is or is not re-
quired by law.
This point can be made in a more concrete manner by a hypothetical
case suggested in part by the protracted Swiss Watchmakers0 litigation.
Acrimonia is vitally dependent for foreign exchange on its export of elec-
tronic mousetraps. The Acrimonian mousetrap industry was once severely
damaged by a price war among the various Acrimonian firms, which oc-
cured simultaneously with a sharp upturn in the cat birth rate. In order
to prevent the recurrence of such a situation, the government of Acrimonia
took a number of steps. However, Acrimonia is not a believer in social-
ism; and government officials did not wish to impede entrepreneurs any
further than absolutely necessary in the national interest. So the officials
institute a program of government subsidies to "cooperative and public-
spirited" mousetrap manufacturers, "cooperative and public-spirited" being
defined as "adhering to reasonable business methods and affiliated with a
national cartel" which in turn allocates markets, sets output limitations,
and fixes minimum prices. There is, however, no "compulsion" to join
the cartel in the sense of a law or regulation requiring membership, nor is
there a criminal penalty attached to not being "public-spirited and cooper-
ative."
It is difficult to see why Acrimonia's public policy is not as directly
involved in this sort of scheme as it would be if Acrimonia required anti-
competitive behavior by law. That is to say, it is incorrect to assume that
every vital state interest will be embodied in the form of a law forbidding
or compelling certain behavior, although it may be correct to assume that a
state has a vital interest in encouraging all behavior it makes compulsory
and in discouraging all behavior it outlaws.
Gs Supra, note 16.
69 See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
70 Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center Inc., 1963 TRADE CAs. 5 70,600, at
77,414 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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C. Alternative Theories of Jurisdiction
1. Passive Personality
Although the "passive personality" test was recognized as at least an
alternative basis for jurisdiction in the Branch case,71 it offers little promise
as a method for resolving the dilemma of a nation wishing to apply sanc-
tions to conduct abroad but unwilling to rely on any of the more tradi-
tional and (hopefully) discredited theories discussed above. In the first
place, passive personality is merely the effects test applied to nationals
rather than to the nation or the nation's commerce, and would appear,
therefore, to be subject to all the objections which have been raised to the
effects test. Secondly, authoritative writers have rejected it as a basis of
jurisdiction. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law states: "A state
does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground
that the conduct affects one of its nationals. 72
2. Nationality
Although some authorities profess a belief that there is scant precedent
for the use of nationality as a basis for antitrust jurisdiction,7 there is vir-
tually universal acceptance of the proposition that the "absent citizen is
subject to the state's legislative commands" 74 and that, consequently, a state
may impose sanctions on the conduct of a citizen, no matter where the cit-
izen commits the acts comprising the conduct.75  Like the principle of
strict territoriality, the nationality principle has the virtue of being unlikely
to offend foreign sovereigns. But it also shares the fault of the nationality
principle, namely, that forbidden conduct by foreign nationals committed
outside the United States can not be touched. Not only would all aliens
be free to restrain United States commerce, but the United States would
not even have the satisfaction of knowing that, although monopoly profits
were being made, the Amercan firms were sharing in them. Neither na-
tionality nor passive personality offers any more satisfactory results than
territoriality or effects.
3. Conflict of Laws-"Private Law Perspectives on a
Public Law Problem"
One very actively developing area of international jurisdiction in re-
71 Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944).
72 Supra note 16, § 30(2).
73 Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach of Ameri-
can Regulatory Legislation, 22 OHIo ST. L.J. 586, 604-08 (1961).
74 GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws, § 73 (4th ed. E. Scoles 1964).
75 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-38 (1932); RETATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 30(1)(a); RESTATEmENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 47(2) (1934).
Cf. Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946] A. C. 347 (House of Lords).
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cent years has been the field of conflict of laws or "private international
law." The reaction against one of Harvard's greatest pooh-bahs, Professor
Joseph Beale, symbolized by the works of Cook 6 and Lorenzen,7 7 has de-
veloped into a search for new methods to ascertain the correct law to apply
to a set of facts involving more than one state.78 While it is not suggested
that the theories taken over from private law will provide instant solutions
for the complex public law problems involved, they offer more promise than
any of the traditional doctrines in providing an adequate theoretical basis
for dealing with the problems.79
In this essay those conflict of law theories are dealt with which appear
to offer promise in aiding the solution of the problems in question. Other
theories, rejected because they are considered of little or no help in this
context, however useful they may be elsewhere, are discussed in the Ap-
pendix.
(a) Professor Falk's "Reasonableness" Approach
Professor Falk advocates an abandonment of the effects test and the
substitution of a more flexible approach:
Rather than attempt to prove that the event should be treated as if it
took place inside United States territory it would seem more convincing
to use the more flexible approach expressed in § 42(1) of the Second
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws (Tentative Draft No. 3).
§ 42 Definition of jurisdiction
(1) A state may create or affect legal interests whenever its contacts with
a person, thing or occurrence are sufficient to make such action reasonable. 80
The virtues of this approach are that it "does not isolate a single factor
and make its existence or non-existence crucial to the claim of jurisdiction"
but instead evaluates the whole situation."1 "Reasonableness" implies self-
delimitation of competence and this self-delimitation "should seek to take
maximum account of the existence of other states and give effect to a
mutually satisfactory standard of reciprocity." 82
76 COOK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES, supra note 49.
77 E. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947).
7 SLeflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAIP. L REv.
1584 (1966).
79A modem conflict of laws approach to this problem has, to the best of my knowledge,
never been taken by an American court. Courts have, however, used this approach in similar
circumstances in Jones Act cases. See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). A number of
writers have discussed the uses of conflict of laws in the area of extraterritorial application of
antitrust laws. See e.g. Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse, supra n. 49; Trautman, The
Role of Conflicts Thinking, supra note 73; Note, Limitations on Federal Judicial Power, supra
note 49; Comment, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws: A Conflict of Laws Ap-
proach, 70 YALE L.J. 259 (1960).
80 Falk, International Jurisdiction, supra note 49, at 304-06.
811d.
82 Id. at 320.
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Professor Falk's proposal is notable both for its rejection of traditional
antitrust jurisdictional theories and its modern approach to conflict of laws.
It appears to set the court, looking for a way through the mire, on the
right path; and its only real drawback would appear to be that it does not
provide sufficient guideposts.
(b) Professor Baxter's "Comparative Impairment"
Professor William Baxter provides what appears to be a useful method
of resolving conflicts in the area. First, he points out
. . . in choice-of-law cases there are two distinct types of govern-
mental objectives, internal and external. The internal objectives are those
underlying each state's resolution of conflicting private interests. These ob-
jectives inhere in a case even if the fact situation is wholly localized to a
single state.... External objectives are introduced when a transaction af-
fects persons identified with different states. They are the objectives of
each state to make effective, in all situations involving persons as to whom
it has responsibility for legal ordering, that resolution of contending pri-
vate interests the state has made for local purposes. In each real conflicts
case the external objective of one state must be subordinated. The choice
problem posed is that of allocating spheres of lawmaking control.
[O]ne can articulate and apply a normative principle to determine
which external objective to subordinate. The principle is to subordinate,
in the particular case, the external objective of the state whose internal ob-
jective will be least impaired in general scope and impact, by subordination
in cases like the one at hand.
Implicit in the principle is the assertion that a court can and should
be beyond a determination whether a state has any governmental interest
in the application of its internal law-that a court can and should deter-
mine which state's internal objective will be least impaired by subordina-
tion in cases like the one before it.83
He warns that the task he proposes to set to court is not an easy one:
The inquiries that must precede application of this principle are often
difficult. Judicial attempts to apply the principle often would be accom-
panied by inadequately articulated opinions and sometimes would be
demonstrably erroneous. But such failings attend judicial application of
many legal criteria; and even if it is assumed that error is more common in
the application of general than of precise criteria, it does not follow that
all such criteria ought to be abandoned.8 4
And he answers the criticism that the task would be too much for courts:
The objection that courts are not equipped to discover the facts upon
which resolution must turn is equally applicable to a very large percentage
of our judge-made rules of law.8 5
83 Baxter, Choice ot Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L REV. I, 17-18 (1963).
84 Id. at 19.
Sr Id. at 21.
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Comparative impairment would mean that the court would have to
make some difficult decisions. But it would provide a means for resolv-
ing the perplexing problem of the dash between a strong foreign state in-
terest in restrictive practices and the American interest in keeping trade
free.
(c) Theories for Resolving Multistate Problems
In their formidable casebook,8 Professors Von Mehren and Trautman
make a number of worthwhile suggestions concerning methods for resolu-
tion of multistate problems. First, they point out that a conflict of laws is
not simply a struggle between discordant internal policies of separate states.
An interstate or multistate case involves domestic policies, to be sure, but
it involves others as well:
A functional analysis calls for examination both of the policy balances
struck in the domestic-law rules and of any multijurisdictional policies that
the jurisdiction may have, that is to say, general policies deriving from a
community's position as a single unit of a larger community.87
A court balancing the interests to determine if American antitrust law
applies should, it would seem, take into the equation not only the domestic
policies of the United States and other concerned jurisdictions but also
their general policies, such as those enumerated as aforementioned in Sec-
tion II, E.
Secondly, they point out methods for resolving the question of which
jurisdictions interest in a matter predominates.
* . . [A]nalysis of the domestic-law policies of two concerned juris-
dictions may suggest that even though the respective domestic-law policies
are of relatively equal weight, the concern of jurisdiction X, in light of its
relation to a multistate transaction far outweights that of jurisdiction Y....
even if the individual concerns of the several jurisdictions are of relatively
equal weight, there frequently occurs what might be termed an aggrega-
tion of concerns in one jurisdiction: X may be a concerned jurisdiction on
more than one basis, as compared with jurisdiction Y, which is con-
cemed on only one basis.88
This would appear to resolve problems of contracts made in a state
strongly opposed to antitrust, which are meant to and have most of their
important anticompetitive consequences in the United States.
There is another basis for solving such problems, however:
Frequently conflicts between the regulating rules of two concerned juris-
dictions can rationally be resolved by examining the strength of the do-
86 . VoN MHmREN AND D. TkATmA, THE LAw oi: MULTISTATB PROBLEMS (1965).
87Id. at 216.
88 Id. at 341-42.
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mestic law and multijurisdictional policies that lead each concerned juris-
diction to select its regulating rule.89
A state with a regressing anticompetitive policy will be entitled to have
that policy given less weight by an American court than a state which
steadfastly adheres to a form of neo-mercantilism.
Narrowly defined policies of one jurisdiction are entitled to greater
weight in the equation than more sweeping policies." Thus a rule of
per se illegality for price-fixing should prevail over some more general
rule aimed at fostering cartelization.
Finally, there is a situation presumed by Von Mehren and Trautman
to be rare in conflicts cases generally, but which seems to appear, all too
frequently in antitrust cases. "When the concerned jurisdictions have
conflicting views, when no one jurisdiction is predominantly concerned,
and when analysis of the strength of each jurisdiction's policies discloses
no clear basis for choice," the situation where "one concerned jurisdiction's
rule would prohibit what another's permits" should be resolved in favor of
upholding the transaction."1 This policy in favor of upholding multistate
transactions is qualified, however, by a subsequent statement that in cases
of such "irreducible conflicts" the forum may be justified in applying its
own law. 2  On the whole, however, Von Mehren and Trautman appear
to favor a policy which, when applied to antitrust, would tip the balance
against application of American antitrust law when it would otherwise be
in equipoise.
D. Choice-Influencing Considerations
Professor Leflar offers five principles which he believes ought to influ-
ence the court in its choice of law.9 3 The first of these, "predictability," is
not of much aid, since universal application of the antitrust laws would
appear to offer as much predictability as universal non-application 4 The
second, "maintenance of interstate and international order," which appears
to mean "a minimum of mutual interference with claims or aspirations to
sovereignty," likewise is neutral. 5 As pointed out earlier," mutual inter-
ference can result from applying antitrust laws or from allowing persons
in a state's jurisdiction to violate the foreign law with impunity. "Simpli-
fication of the judicial task"'9 could go either way as well; a rule that for-
8o1,. at 376.
901d. at 377-78.
91 Id. at 406-07.
921d. at 407.
o3 Leflar, Conflicts Law, supra note 78.
941d. at 1586.
05 Id.
O See text accompanying note 48, supra.
97 Leflar, Conflicts Law, supra note 78 at 1586-87.
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eign law shall always apply simplifies the judicial task about as well as a
rule directing that American law shall always be applied. However, Pro-
fessor Leflar's last two considerations, "advancement of the forum's govern-
mental interests" 98 and "application of the better rule of law,'"9 appear to
favor the extension of the antitrust laws to foreign facts. Unless there is
little or no chance that the violation will have any consequences here, the
governmental interests of the United States will be advanced by applying
our laws. The American antitrust laws are surely the "better law" both
in terms of our own view of things and in view of a foreign trend away
from governmental disinterest in competition and from governmental sup-
port of cartelization.
IV. CONCLUSION-THE METHOD APPLIED
It is contended that the courts of the United States should discontinue
talk about "territoriality" and "effects" and frankly administer the antitrust
laws on the basis of a balancing of exclusive and inclusive interests, whether
that balancing be called "reasonableness, .... comparative impairment," or
resolution of "multistate problems." Indications of how this method ought
to be applied have been given earlier, in the policy statement 00 and in the
discussion of the various methods. The conclusion will consider some of
the more specific applications of this method.
A. Protection of Foreign Business Community
Where compliance with our antitrust policy would violate no foreign
law but would have a significant effect on the business community of a for-
eign nation (e.g., by causing the insolvency of a major competitor in that
community), the governmental interest of the foreign nation is entitled to
greater weight than it would be entitled to if only slight economic dislo-
cation resulted from compliance with our law.101 Perhaps "the protection
of the foreign business community" should only be entitled to considera-
tion insofar as the remedy is concerned, so that our decrees will not inter-
fere with existing contracts which are due to expire shortly but will forbid
the renewal or renegotiation of such contracts if they appear to constitute
a danger to American freedom of commerce.
B. Consideration of Vested Rights
Where the antitrust violation is embodied in contract, it is entitled to
less consideration than where it is a property right or a business organiza-
tion on which people have been relying for a number of years. The for-
98Id. at 1587.
99 Id. at 1587-88.
100 See Section II, supra.
101 K. BREWSTER, ANTTRusT AND AMEIcAN BusINEss ABROAD 303 (1958).
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eign government has a greater interest in preserving the rights of its prop-
erty owners and shareholders than it has in upholding their freedom of
contract.
10 2
C. Similarity of Economic Interests
Where a nation has similar economic interests to those of the United
States, we should much more readily apply our law than in those situa-
tions where our interests are dissimilar. An example of similar economic
interests is a situation where a cartel in country X limits production, thus
reducing American imports of the product of the cartel but at the same
time reduces X's exports thereof. As a matter of first impression, one
would expect X to be unhappy over limitations on its exports and to be
willing to lend a hand in breaking up the cartel or at least willing to have
the United States break up the cartel. 10 3
There can be little doubt that much remains to be done in this field.
But if courts will accept the guidelines set down by conflicts writers and
weigh the competing interests carefully, they will be able to reach more
intellectually honest opinions than use of the outmoded economic effects
tests allows them to do.
APPENDIX-THE PROCESS OF CLM 1M 4
1. Scope of Competence Demanded
A. Objectives
The principal objective of the forum would appear to be the resolution of the
controversy by application of a prescription to foreign parties or to foreign activities
of a domestic party.
B. Situations
(1) Physical location of the parties allegedly acting in violation of the
trade regulations.
(i) Domicil (or residence) or nationality. So far as individuals
are concerned, their physical location for jurisdictional purposes includes the place
which the law decrees to be their homes (domicil) and the nation to which the
law determines they owe allegiance (nationality).
(ii) Place of incorporation. The physical location of a corporation
includes the place in which it is incorporated, since the law attaching consequences
to the conduct of that corporation will in large measure be the law of that place.105
(iii) Place where business is done. The corporation, partnership,
proprietorship, or individual may be located, for jurisdictional purposes, in any
place in which it (he) does a substantial amount of business.'06
102Id. at 303-04.
103 Id. at 304.
104 The categories in this section are derived from the work of Professors McDougal and Lass-
well. See particularly McDoUGAL, LASSWELL AND VLAsIc, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN
SPACE 646-748 (1963) and LASSWELL AND KAPLAN, PoWER AND SocIETy, passim (1950).
205 See the venue provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (c).
206 Id.
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(iv) Principal place of business-center of business activity.
Though this category overlaps in many cases with (ii) and in all cases with (iii)
supra, it has independent significance because it is the prime location of the busi-
ness entity in terms of actual conduct rather than merely in terms of legal status.107
(v) Place where the parties are served with process. The place
of service of process assumes importance in those instances in which the main
link, the crucial link, between the forum and the parties is the fact that process
has been served upon them from that forum.'08 Certainly there is a difference be-
tween service on the company's president in his office within the district, service on
an officer of the company while flying over the district in an airliner which does
not land within that district,'09 and service in a foreign country upon the company's
officers there.
(2) Locus of events where the actions allegedly violating the antitrust
law took place.
(i) Place(s) of contracting (or conspiring). While modern law
places less emphasis on this fact than the orthodoxy of a few years ago did, it is
still considered relevant.1 0
(ii) Place(s) of performance. It is also considered significant."'
(iii) Place(s) where the most important events relevant to the mak-
ing of the contract or its performance took place (significant contacts). Recent
writing in the area of conflict of laws emphasizes the fact that the place where
the agreement is entered into or is to be performed may not necessarily be the
place with the most vital interests in the contract. The significant contacts theory
looks to the abovementioned locations, but to other places as well if they are relevant
in determining which state has the most significant contacts.112
(iv) Place(s) where the most important impact of the activity is
felt. Significant contacts are generally thought to be questions relating to the
formalities preceding the making of the contract and the actual making and per-
formance thereof. But if the contract is entered into in state Y between citizens
of state X and is performed in state Z with the result that it becomes impossible
for persons in state A to purchase an item, then it is obvious that state A, though
lacking "significant contacts" with the contract itself, may be vitally interested therein
because of the effect of that contract.
C. Base Values
There are four basic forms of wealth belonging to aliens within the forum
state which are vulnerable to attack by fine or private treble damage suit. These
are real property, personal (tangible) property, intangible property (held in the name
of the alien), and debts owed by the alien's domestic debtors to the alien (garnish-
ment) .113
107 Cf. the treatment of a corporation whose principal place of business is within a state as a
citizen of that state, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c).
108 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1) allows service of process upon a person within a district, no matter
how transitory his stay there. Rule 4(i) provides for service of process abroad, where authorized
by statute.
109 Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
110 Compare RESTATEMENT OF CoNFLIcr OF LAws § 311 (1934) with RESTATEIENT
(SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
'
1 1lRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 110, § 188 2(c); H.
GooRucH, CONFLIC OF LAws § 114 (4th ed. . Scoles 1964).
112 Id.
113 See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
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D. Strategies
(1) Service of process in personam. This would include not only
service upon the person sought to be sued, but service upon an officer of a corpo-
ration and service upon an agent of a person. "Personal service" refers to service
of process upon a person; there is no general requirement that the service be made
by handing the process to him personally.1 4
(2) Attachment of property. While one cannot always serve process
upon a person within (or without) the district, there is in many cases a strategy
available as a supplement to personal jurisdiction. This is jurisdiction quasi in rem
based on the person's ownership of property within the district."15
F. Outcomes
Outcomes can be divided into two categories: (1) the decisions reached, and
(2) the sanctions imposed.
(1) Decisions
(i) Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. This may be a decision
based on lack of jurisdiction over the person (failure to serve process correctly, no
method provided whereby defendant can be properly served) or lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter (no showing that the conduct alleged comes within the
purview of any applicable statute).
(ii) Application of foreign law. For a variety of reasons (e.g.,
promotion of mutual trust, belief that foreign law is the better law, belief that
foreign interests and contacts in the case outweigh domestic ones), the court may
"apply" foreign law to the case in question, i.e., it may decide the case in accord-
ance with those principles of law prevalent in the foreign country.
(iii) Application of domestic law. If the court decides that it hasjurisdiction over the parties and subject matter in controversy and that the law to
be applied is not foreign law, then it will apply domestic law to the case, i.e., it
will treat the case as if it were one arising under its own antitrust law. (This is
not to say, however, that it treats the case exactly in the same manner as it would
treat a wholly domestic case.)
(2) Sanctions. Assuming that, upon application of domestic (or con-
ceivably, foreign) law to the case, a violation of the antitrust laws has been de-
creed, there are three basic sanctions available:
(i) Damages. This sanction, used in the United States in private
suits, serves the purpose of restoring to the plaintiff that which he lost through
defendant's tortious conduct. Since the damages are thrice the amount of actual
damage proved, the sanction also serves as punishment for the wrongdoer.
(ii) Injunction. By this sanction, the evil perpetrated is prevented
from continuing.
(iii) Divestiture. Where it is impossible to stop violations of the
laws so long as a combination of business enterprises persists, the court will order
the combination dissolved."16
2. The Process of Claim
A. Participants
(1) Parties brought before the court. This category includes those
governments, corporations, and individuals who are the actual plaintiffs and de-
fendants in the action at bar.
114 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
11$See Pennington v. Fourth Nat'I Bank of Cincinnati, Ohio, 243 U.S. 269 (1917)(Brandeis, J.).
116 United States v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
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(2) Individuals and corporations directly affected by the outcome
though not parties to the action. This would include companies having contracts
with the defendants which the defendants could no longer perform because pro-
hibited from doing so by the decree in the antitrust suit."17
(3) Individuals and corporations whose behavior is affected indirectly
by the action of the court. This category includes businessmen who are made
wary by the decree of concluding agreements similar to those struck down and are
encouraged to enter into agreements like those sustained.
(4) Foreign sovereigns. In a large number of antitrust cases, foreign
sovereigns have felt their interests to be so affected by the pending litigation as to
take an active part in it, by filing protests with the State Department,"18 or by filing
briefs in the cases as amici curiae."9
B. Objectives
Objectives of the nation seeking to apply its antitrust law generally fit within
one or more of the following categories.
(1) Restoration of competitive conditions in the forum's foreign (and
domestic) trade.
(2) Deterrence of further violations of the law by the parties to the
suit and deterrence of future violations in general.
(3) Reparation of damages to individuals and corporations caused by
violations.
(4) Punishment of offenders.
(5) Establishment of standards of conduct so that other participants
in the marketplace can carry on a profitable business without running afoul of the
law.
C. Situations
(1) Persons outside. The Court will generally be dealing with per-
sons (legal and actual) who exist outside the boundaries of the forum state.
(2) Contracts, conspiracies, and other behavior outside. The court
will also be involved with the nature and provisions of contracts, conspiracies, and
courses of dealing in nations outside the forum.
D. Base Values
The base values sought to be affected include the corporate licenses, rights
under contracts and other intangible assets of the foreign defendants. They also
include corporate and personal tangible assets. In a more general manner the base
values affected comprehend the policies 120 and programs121 of a foreign sovereign.
E. Strategies
(1) Diplomatic. The diplomatic strategy may be employed to negotiate
treaties with antitrust provisions therein (such as the EEC treaty)' 22 or to dis-
courage a nation from allowing monopolists from operating within its borders.
(2) Ideological. The use of publicity is often effective in mobilizing
"7 Cf. the British Nylon Spinners litigation. United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); British Nylon Spinners v. Imperial Chemical Industries
[1952) ALL E.R. 780 (Ct. App.).
118 INT'L LAW ASS'N, spra note 7, at 565.
1iid. at 575-76.
120 As used here, a "policy" is a general course of action by which a government seeks to
further an interest.
121 As used here, a "program" is a specific means of furthering one or more governmental
interests.
12 IN''L LAW ASS'N, supra note 7, at 473-76.
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public opinion against monopolies at home; hardly a week goes by without an ad-
vertisement in the New York Times by an antitrust defendant attempting to counter
the bad publicity caused by the bringing of the case. Such a strategy could be
mobilized in foreign contexts as well.
(3) Economic. In a context such as antitrust, the use of the economic
strategy naturally suggests itself. An example would be government procurement
regulations which gave special consideration to the bids of small competitors.
F. Outcomes
Outcomes can be evaluated with regard to all values.
3. Interest Sought to be Protected
A. Participants
Participants can be classified on a descending scale of direct involvement of
their interests:
(I) Parties to the litigation.
(i) Those directly affected by the outcome of the litigation (com-
petitors of defendants, for example).
(ii) Those whose interests are remotely affected by the outcome
(e.g., consumers).
B. Objectives
(1) Protection of individuals involved. The antitrust laws, while per-
haps not primarily concerned with the protection of individual competitors as such,
can be invoked by them for the protection of their interests against anticompeti-
tive behavior by others.' 23
(2) Protection of those directly involved in the activity concerned.
As presently interpreted, antitrust laws are used to protect smaller competitors, as a
class, in an industry from the accumulation of too much power in the hands of
large competitors. 2 4
(3) Protection of specialized classes within society. Certain groups
within society, most notably consumers, are sought to be protected by antitrust
statutes.' 25
(4) Protection of value processes. The antitrust statutes have as their
goal the protection of a competitive economy and the benefits derived by consumers
from the efficient use of resources and the pluralistic distribution of power which
such an economy provides.
C. Situations
Situations comprehend ont only the international economy but also
(1) Regional economies (e.g., the EEC).
(2) National economies.
(3) Subdivisions of national economies (along sectional or product
lines).
(4) Subdivisions of sectional' 26 or product lines.' 2 7
D. Base Values
The base values to be included range from property of citizens of the forum
state (United States) to the policies and programs of the forum state.
123 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
1241Brown Shoe Co. Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
12 5 See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
-'2 United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
127 Brown Shoe Co. Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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E. Strategies
The economic strategies are sought to be protected by producing (or preserv-
ing) an unfettered economy. Such an economy is generally considered to be neces-
sary for the continued effectiveness of military, diplomatic, and ideological strategies.
F. Outcomes
Outcomes include
(1) The consequentiality of the change inflicted by events taking place
outside the forum state.
(2) The magnitude of the impact of such events on the various value
processes affected.
(3) The intensity of that impact.
G. Effects
Effects should include the long-range consequences of impacts upon value pro-
cesses.
4. The Counterclaim to the Competence Asserted
A. Claim that the decision-maker is not sufficiently connected with the con-
troversy or the interests at stake to apply policy. This may amount to more than
an assertion of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It can include the claim that
international law would be violated by such an application of the law by the de-
cison-maker.
B. Claim that although the decision-maker is sufficiently connected with
the events to apply its law, another decison-maker (most likely the counterclaim-
ant) is more appropriate to decide the issue by virtue of a more significant connec-
tion with the parties, contracts, etc.' involved.
C. Claim that defendant is immune from competence to apply. An ob-
vious example of this immunity claim is the assertion that defendant is partly or
entirely owned by the government of a foreign sovereign and is therefore entitled
to sovereign immunity.
APPENDIX-THE NEW ORTHODOXY OF THE SECOND RESTATEMENT
One can hardly enter the area of the Conflict of Laws without paying some at-
tention to the Second Restatement. Since antitrust regulation partakes of the char-
acter of contract law (contracts, conspiracies, and courses of dealing) and of torts
(inasmuch as a private party can seek damages under the statute for civil wrongs
done him by the violation of the statute), it is necessary to pay attention to the pro-
visions of the Second Restatement in both fields.
The relevant section for ascertaining the validity of the contract is § 188. With
an exception not here pertinent, the Restatement says that the governing law is that
chosen by the parties, or, in the absence of an effective choice by the parties, the law
of the state with which the contract has the most significant relationship. The
factors to which consideration should be given in determining the state with which
the contract has its most significant relationship include, but are not limited to,
the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the place of performance, the
situs of the subject matter of the contract, the domicil, residence, nationality, place
of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and the place under whose
local law the contract will be most effective.128
The basic rule for torts is similar. "The local law of the state" having "the
most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines
128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws, supra note 110 §§ 186-188 (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1960).
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their rights and liabilities in tort." The important contacts to be considered in
determining the state of most significant relationship include "the place where the
injury occurred," "the place where the conduct occurred," "the domicil, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties," and "the place where
the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered." Finally, the court of
the forum in determining the relative importance of the contacts "will consider
the issues, the character of the tori and the relevant purposes of the tort rules of the
interested states."' 29
Neither of these sections appears to be of much help in advancing the cause
of the United States. If parties are able to select the law governing the validity of
their contracts, they will almost certainly choose the law of a nation with little or
no antitrust regulation, rather than the law of the United States. In case the choice
was not effective, the rules as to significant relationship would likely compel appli-
cation of some law other than the United States, for the place of contracting, nego-
tiation, performance, and so forth, will almost certainly be some nation with liberal
antitrust laws. If the contract is intended to restrain trade, it will surely be most
effective under the law of the nation which places the least restricions on such con-
tracts.
The rules as to tort are only slightly better. Though the place where the injury
occurred might be the United States, the place of conduct and the domicil, nation-
ality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the actors will presumably be
without the United States. Neither the "place of relationship" rule nor the dis-
cretion given the court in weighing factors in the last part of the section would
appear to give the United States the right to apply its laws. Under the Second
Restatement, the problem would be solved quickly and simply by denying the
United States jurisdiction to deal with extraterritorial violations.
APPENDIX-PROFESSOR CURRIE'S INTEREST ANALYSIS
Perhaps the best known and at the same time the most controversial of the non-
orthodox theories of conflict of laws is that associated with the name of the late
Professor Brainerd Currie and usually known as "interest analysis." The general
principles of "interest analysis" have been summarized as follows:' 3 0
When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state should furnish the
rule of decision, the court should, first of all, determine the governmen-
tal policy expressed in the law of the forum. It should then inquire
whether the relation of the forum to the case is such as to provide a legit-
imate basis for the assertion of an interest in the application of that policy.
This process is essentially the familiar one of construction or interpreta-
tion ....
If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy expressed
by the foreign law, and whether the foreign state has an interest in the
application of its policy.
1'29d. § 145.
130 This discussion of the thought of Professor Currie may be objected to on the grounds
(1) that it is misplaced, for "Currie's theory was not devised for international conflicts cases,"
EHRENZWEIG, PlrVATH INTERAnONAL LAW, supra note 17 at 64, and (2) that it misstates
Currie's position, since he later changed his mind. See, e.g., Currie, Comment on Babcock v.
Jackson, 63 CoLUm. L. REv. 1233, 1242-43 (1963). The first objection is unimportant, since
reasoning by analogy and not wholesale application of Currie's theory to international cases is
all that is sought. As for the second objection, it seems that Currie's amendments to his thought
do not significantly change those aspects which are of concern in this matter.
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If the court [determines] that the forum state has no interest in the
application of its policy, but the foreign state has, it should apply the for-
eign law.
If the court [holdsl that the forum state has an interest in the applica-
tion of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the
foreign state also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy,
and, a fortiori, it should apply the law of the forum if the foreign state
has no such interest. 31
Because it is willing to look behind the law's "face" and because it emphasizes
the interest the government has in the application of its policy, the interest analysis
method possesses advantages over the simpler effects and strict territoriality the-
ories. By stressing the relationship of the forum to the case, it provides a thresh-
old to prevent cases with remote relationship to vital United States commerce and
cases in which the United States has no interest from being heard. And by calling
on the court to perform an interest analysis on the foreign law as well, it may well
prevent some of the horribles detailed under the heading "Abnegation of Jurisdic-
tion Based on Foreign Law," supra. Unfortunately, however, interest analysis, be-
cause of its preference for the law of the forum, does not provide a constructive
method for mediating between contradictory policies. Presumably the United
States will have an interest sufficient to allow it to apply its law in any case where
there is a substantial probability of harm to our economy from a foreign scheme.
But so long as the American interest is more than minimal, a contrary interest of
a foreign nation, no matter how strong, would not be allowed to prevail over it.
The situation would not differ greatly from that prevailing where the test applied
is the effects tests.
APPENDIX-PROFESSOR CAVERS' PRINCIPLES OF PREFERENCE
An early critic of the old orthodoxy,'3 2 Professor David Cavers has recently pro-
posed a number of principles of preference to assist courts in choosing the proper
law to apply to multistate cases. Only one of these principles appears to be pertin-
ent here.
This principle is:
Where the liability laws of the state of injury set a higher standard of
conduct or of financial protection against injury than do the laws of the
state where the person causing the injury has acted or had his home, the
laws of the state of injury should determine the standard and the protec-
tion applicable to the case .... 133
This principle would allow the United States to apply its law whenever an
"injury" was caused here by anticompetitive behavior abroad. Unfortunately, the
concept of state of injury comes rather close to the language of effect; and, even
assuming that an "injury" is a much more sophistocated concept than an "effect,"
this principle would always result in preference being given to American law, no
matter how important the interest of the foreign state.
13 1 B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 183-84 (1963).
132 Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933).
L3 3 CAVERS, CHOICE OF LAw PRocEss, supra note 17 at 139.
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